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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between the reform of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the development of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). More precisely, it addresses the 
question to what extent and how the UN institutional structure has an impact on 
European integration in the field of foreign and security policy. To answer this 
question, the paper analyses, on the one hand, the debate on the European 
presence and representation within the Security Council, and on the other hand, the 
EU’s increasing coordination on the issues discussed in this body. Finally, it looks at 
how future reforms of the UNSC would affect the CFSP.  
The growing role of regional organisations in the United Nations is increasing the 
pressure to reform the UN. In Europe, the discussion on the reform of the UN has run 
parallel to the institutionalisation of the CFSP. Since the Maastricht Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU), the CFSP began raising expectations about the possible role of the 
EU in the UN, ranging from a common representation to a more effective 
coordination of the EU member states in the Security Council.  
I argue that the reforms of the United Nations and of the EU are mutually 
reinforcing. On the one hand, further European integration pressures the UN to 
reform. On the other hand, the UN reform (or the prospect of reform) has an impact 
on the CFSP. First, it frames the discourse and national preferences of the member 
states and, secondly, it opens new institutional opportunities and paths for European 
integration in foreign policy. In this sense, the structure of the new UNSC could have 
an effect on the future development of the CFSP, either strengthening the current 
trend towards flexible forms of cooperation or encouraging new patterns of 
integration, coordination and representation. BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between the United Nations Security 
Council reform and the evolution of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy to 
answer the question of whether and how are these two processes linked. Rather than 
focussing on the policy discussions, the paper looks at the institutional dimension of 
the EU’s presence in the UN and at its relation with the debate on the reform of the 
UNSC. To answer the research question, the paper, firstly, looks at how the debate on 
reform has framed the EU member states’ strategies towards EU coordination and 
representation in the Security Council. Secondly, it draws up some educated guesses 
on what would be the impact of a reform of the UNSC on CFSP. 
It is widely recognised that the Security Council needs to be reformed to take 
into account the new international structure, as it risks losing both its legitimacy and 
effectiveness. Yet, more than fifteen years of debates and negotiations in and 
outside the UN General Assembly have not led to any result, and the unreformed 
and anachronistic UNSC continues to “stick out like a sore thumb”.1 On this matter, 
the EU member states are divided in two camps that either support or oppose 
Germany’s permanent UNSC membership.2 Being one of the most influential groups 
in the UN and an important motor of the broader UN reform process, the EU’s 
impasse represents a strong constraint on the possibility to find a solution.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the discussion on the reform of the UN has run 
parallel to the institutionalisation of European foreign policy following the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The building of the CFSP and the UN reform became somewhat 
intertwined and related issues, as integrationists started to see in the long-term 
perspective of a single seat for Europe at the UN the culmination of the process of 
integration in foreign policy.3 In fact, in Europe the division over UN reform is framed 
by the opposing views on what European foreign policy is and should become: a 
European common and integrated policy or a more flexible intergovernmental 
cooperation under the leadership of a directoire of states. Outside Europe, the 
                                                 
1 United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Resumes Debate on Security Council 
Reform with Several Divergent Proposals Still under Consideration”, Press Release, 20 July 2006, 
www.un.org/news/press/docs/2006/ga10484.doc.htm (10/9/2007). 
2 For a recent account see Ulrich Roos, Ulrich Franke and Gunther Hellmann, “Beyond the 
Deadlock: How Europe Can Contribute to UN Reform”, The International Spectator, Vol. 43, 
No. 1, 2008, pp. 43-55. 
3 See for example Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis in Financial Times, 7 September 
1990, quoted in Panos Tsakaloyannis and Dimitris Bourantonis, “The EU’s CFSP and the Reform 
of the Security Council”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1997, p. 198. Daniele Marchesi 
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pressure to reform the UN is accentuated by the expectations created by the rise of 
new players such as the EU and their role in global governance.4 Many, for instance, 
argue that the new UNSC should take the process of regional integration into 
account.5 
The key hypothesis of this paper is that the reform of the United Nations and that 
of the EU are mutually reinforcing. Further European integration pressures the UN to 
reform and the UN reform opens new venues for European integration in foreign 
policy. I argue that the structure of the UNSC has had an important influence on the 
institutional development of the CFSP and that its reform could represent a “critical 
juncture” for the future of the EU’s foreign policy.  
This research draws on secondary literature,6 the UN archive of the debates in 
the UNSC since 1993 and on a series of interviews carried out by the author in New 
York and Brussels between 2004 and 2008. The next chapter provides the theoretical 
and conceptual framework of this work, which attempts to temperate the traditional 
realist perspective toward UNSC reform with insights from historical and sociological 
institutionalism. A clearer conceptual framework of different member states’ objec-
tives in the context of UN reform is also provided. The third part explains the evolution 
of the institutional set-up of the EU in the UNSC in terms of coordination and represen-
tation and looks at how it has been framed by the different strategies towards UNSC 
reform. Some of the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are also discussed. The 
last part picks up the key proposals of UNSC reform and assesses their possible 
                                                 
4 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s Interna-
tional Role”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1993, pp. 305-328. 
5 Kennedy Graham and Tânia Felício, Regional Security and Global Governance: A Study of 
Interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council - With a Proposal for a 
Regional-Global Security Mechanism, Brussels, VUB Press, 2006. 
6 For studies on EU coordination in the Security Council see Mary Farrell, “EU Representation 
and Coordination within the United Nations”, in Katie Laatikainen and Karen Smith (eds.), The 
European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms, New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006, pp. 27-46; Edith Drieskens, Daniele Marchesi and Bart Kerremans, “In Search 
of a European Dimension in the UN Security Council”, The International Spectator, Vol. 42, No. 
3, 2007, pp. 421-430; Helen Young, “How to Unravel the Spider’s Web: EU Coordination at the 
United Nations”, paper presented at the EU Political Multilateralism and Interaction with the 
UN Garnet Ph.D. School, United Nations University, Bruges, 10-14 December 2006, using public 
policy and network analysis; Johan Verbeke, “EU Coordination on UN Security Council 
Matters”, in Jan Wouters, Frank Hoffmeister and Tom Ruys (eds.), The United Nations and the 
European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, pp. 49-60; 
and Edith Drieskens, “EU Actorness in the UN Security Council, A Conceptual and Theoretical 
Framework”, paper presented at the EU Political Multilateralism and Interaction with the UN 
Garnet Ph.D. School, United Nations University, Bruges, 10-14 December 2006, focusing on 
principal-agent theory. BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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impact on the future of the CFSP. Two scenarios are drafted on how the EU would 
stand on the world stage, depending on the type of reform actually implemented. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
Since European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, European coordination in 
foreign policy has remained largely intergovernmental in character and the second 
pillar still displays a very limited transfer (or spill-over) of competences to the 
supranational level and unanimity voting. Although the European Parliament and in 
particular the Commission do play an increasing role, mainly through their wide 
range of normative, institutional and financial instruments, the member states remain 
the key actors.7 This is definitely the case for the matters discussed in the UNSC. As a 
consequence, it is tempting to adopt an exclusively realist approach toward these 
matters and to focus only on member states’ preferences.8 On the one hand, this 
approach has helped elucidating in detail the interests of member states in the 
problem of reforming the UNSC. On the other hand, it has shown that these 
preferences have been particularly stable in the last fifteen years (at least since the 
entry into force of the TEU in 1993) and that there is little evidence of convergence or 
of socialisation on this issue. Realist / liberal intergovernmentalist analysis has also 
concentrated on the big players:9 the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Indeed, the 
interplay of this quartet on UNSC reform offers plenty of material for classical 
rationalist interpretation. Germany, following reunification, has started claiming a 
permanent status in the UNSC. Italy has immediately opposed this eventuality, 
fearing a loss of status as the only big EU member state without such a privileged 
position on the world stage. The UK and, particularly, France have slowly but surely 
realised that a permanent seat for Germany in its national capacity would legitimise 
their own permanent seats, which are increasingly seen by the wider UN membership 
as relics of their colonial past. For this reason, they have progressively supported 
Germany in order to diminish the pressure inside and outside Europe to relinquish their 
                                                 
7 Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of 
Western Europe”, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915. 
8 Laatikainen and Smith, op.cit., introduction, explain that realism is still very insightful in 
explaining EU actorness in the UNSC. 
9 See Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez 
(eds.),  European Integration Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 75-94; and 
Filippo Andreatta, “Theory and the European Union’s International Relations”, in Christopher 
Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp. 18-38. Daniele Marchesi 
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own seats in favour of a common European representation. Notably, in the first 
phase of the UNSC reform process in the mid-1990s, their support for Germany had 
been a lot less enthusiastic: the situation in Europe, with the newly established EU, 
was perceived as too fluid to allow such a development. German reunification was 
too close in time, and the Union had not yet embarked upon the endeavour of its 
enlargement to the East. The evolution of the international situation, with Europe 
powerless over a collapsing Yugoslavia, convinced the two big states that it was time 
to forge a smaller club inside the Union, providing leadership and steering and 
projecting Europe as a global actor. 10 
However, even in the domain of the UNSC, a purely rationalist analysis that only 
takes into account member states’ interests offers an insufficient explanation. It will 
be useful to incorporate some of the insights coming from historical and sociological 
institutionalism.11 Notably, the concepts of path-dependency and appropriateness 
can temper the rationalist and realist claims of explaining the current situation and 
constructing plausible scenarios for the future. Path-dependency explains how 
institutions can have a long-term impact that goes beyond the intentions of their 
creators, and how initial institutional choices can restrict the subsequent evolution. 
The creation and reform of institutions can constitute “critical junctures” and 
“institutional opportunities” in structuring and influencing future policy-making. These 
“milestones moments” can be identified both at the EU and UN level (e.g. the 
Maastricht Treaty and the insertion of article 19 TEU, the UN Charter and the institution 
of permanent members and, hypothetically, the future UNSC reform). On the other 
hand, within the sociological/constructivist perspective, “the logic of appropriate-
ness” of each institution (and notably the UNSC) can explain why member states 
adopt behaviours that do not match their self-seeking strategic interest.12  
Before entering the core of the analysis, a further conceptual clarification is 
needed to understand the complexities of the EU’s institutional set-up in the UNSC 
and the different behaviours of member states and institutions. An important starting 
point is that the actors in the CFSP have different perceptions of why it is important 
for the EU to coordinate and be visible within the UN. In this sense, coordination and 
                                                 
10 For a historical overview of this problem, see Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis, op.cit. 
11 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, pp. 251-267; and James G. March and Johan P. 
Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York, The Free Press, 
1989. 
12 Ben Rosamond, “New Theories of European Integration”, in Michelle Cini (ed.), European 
Union Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, particularly pp. 113-117. BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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representation in the UNSC can be seen through the prism of the four main CFSP 
objectives identified by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan:13  external objectives 
(classical foreign policy goals of being effective towards a determined area or issue), 
inter-relational objectives (increasing cooperation and socialisation with the other 
member states), integration objectives (promoting the process of European integra-
tion) and identity objectives (asserting the European identity versus the others). Some 
scholars thus view coordination as a stepping stone towards integration and a 
common policy, while for others it is just a way to exchange information in the effort 
to increase the consistency between independent national policies.  
Furthermore, coordination can be seen as a series of formal and informal 
mechanisms designed to increase internal effectiveness (that is, the capacity of the 
EU to reach a common position and to “speak with a single voice” in the UN) and 
external effectiveness (that is, the capacity of the EU to actually promote 
successfully its position in the UN).14 Although some authors have argued that these 
two dimensions of coordination are mutually reinforcing,15 t h e  w o r k  o f  S m i t h  a n d  
Laatikainen has shown that this is far from clear, as internal coordination involves 
often sacrificing on coordination with third countries in terms of time, resources and 
flexibility. Also here, the perception of the significance of internal and external 
coordination varies between member states. Some will give priority to internal 
effectiveness (i.e. intra-EU coordination) as a means to foster inter-relational, 
integration and identity objectives. This will include promoting forms of common EU 
representation in the Security Council. Others will give priority to external effective-
ness: they will prefer flexible arrangements or core groups to promote Europe’s 
external objectives and interests, and they will appreciate the sheer number of EU 
member states seating in the Security Council. In short, because it touches the core 
of national sovereignty, the issue of EU coordination and representation in the UNSC 
is characterised by the innate ambiguity enshrined in the process of European 
integration. Here, however, the clash between federalist and intergovernmental 
strategies is accentuated by the fact that there is barely any open discussion within 
the EU on this topic. Member states therefore have not been able to develop a 
common discursive framework about what is “good for Europe” in the UNSC (and its 
                                                 
13 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 12-13. 
14 Laatikainen and Smith, op.cit., introduction. 
15 See Philippe Andriaenssens, “Rapprochement between the EU and the UN: History and 
Balance of Intersecting Political Cultures”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
2008, p. 18. Daniele Marchesi 
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reform) and all parties use the EU as a rhetorical argument to justify their rather 
different positions.  
Taking stock of these complexities, the following table provides a conceptual 
map of the different interpretations that can be given to improvements in coordina-
tion and representation in the UNSC, based on the four CFSP objectives. 
 
Objective  EU Coordination  EU Representation 
Integration  • stronger role for common EU 
institutions 
• possibility of taking decisions 
by qualified majority 
• institutional memory among 
EU member states serving as 
elected members in the UNSC 
• presence of institutional actors in the 
UNSC: EU Presidency, Council Secre-
tariat and Commission 
• EU seat or common representation 
• mandate from EU to member states of 
the UNSC 
Identity  • development of common 
positions and alignment of 
member states 
• coordination between EU 
member states both in and 
outside the UNSC  
• more visibility 
• position voiced by EU actors or repres-
entatives of EU actors 
• EU seat or common representation 
Inter-
relational 
• effective communication and 
inclusion of EU member states 
in and outside the UNSC  
• information to EU member 
states outside the UNSC 
• inclusiveness  
• effective rotation on elective seats 
among EU member states 
External  • more flexibility 
• more rapid coordination 
• coordination in Brussels and 
New York resulting in guide-
lines, instead of rigid positions 
• major EU member states in the Security 
Council 
• more discretion for negotiation 
• rapid availability of EU tools across 
pillars 
 
3. The EU in the UNSC  
 
As is the general rule for the UN, only states can be member of the UNSC. This is 
the first and definitive institutional impediment to any EU and CFSP presence or 
actorness in this UN body. However, beyond this legalistic interpretation, the EU has 
some kind of presence in the Security Council, mainly through its member states. 
During 2007, as many as five of the 15 members of the Security Council were also 
members of the EU (France, the UK, Italy, Belgium and Slovakia). In effect, if one looks 
at the absolute number of members, the EU is in the very favourable position of clear 
overrepresentation: two permanent members and, at any given time, up to four BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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elected members (coming from the three different electoral groups).16 However, 
while this situation feeds the resentment of the excluded countries and adds to the 
pressure to reform the UNSC membership, it often does not translate into a cohesive 
and recognisable EU activity within this body. Yet, a coherent voice of the EU 
member states on the matters under discussion in the UNSC is crucial to the credibility 
of the CFSP and of the EU as a whole. Consequently, there is a strong demand to 
enhance EU coordination inside and outside the UNSC and to then represent this 
coordinated and coherent CFSP position in an effective way on the UN stage. While 
this has been done with considerable success in the UN General Assembly and other 
UN bodies,17 things in the UNSC have been developing much more slowly and 
painfully, if at all. This difficulty can be explained with the help of two additional, 
deeply interrelated factors. First, through UNSC coordination/representation, the 
CFSP penetrates into the core of the prerogatives of France and the UK and 
inevitably limits their autonomy as UN permanent members. These two member 
states have no intention to relinquish their status of “great powers” and have 
therefore resisted any European interference.18 Secondly, while the EU has proven 
capable of designing long-term and comprehensive foreign policy approaches, it 
has a structural difficulty in coordinating on short-term crisis management and on the 
use of force, which is the principal domain of competence of the UNSC.  
There is therefore plenty of ground to the claim that the prospects for a 
“common EU policy” in the Security Council are “bleak”.19 Nevertheless, an 
increasing cooperative effort is displayed on the part of the EU member states, and 
a number of provisions and practices have been institutionalised in order to enhance 
the EU presence in the UNSC. This effort has not been constant, but has been 
somewhat influenced by the debate on the reform of the Security Council as will be 
shown when looking at the proposals to improve EU coordination.  
 
                                                 
16 Up to two from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), one from the Eastern 
European Group (EEG) and, if only theoretically, one from the Asia Group (Cyprus).  
17 See the considerable body of research on EU voting cohesion in the UNGA, e.g. Paul Luif, 
“EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly”, EU-ISS Occasional Papers, No. 49, Paris, 
December 2003; and Maximilian Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The 
functioning and coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment, 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Essex, 2006. 
18 Christopher Hill, “The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing 
Arenas”, in Laatikainen and Smith, op.cit. 
19 Rasch, op.cit., p. 316. Daniele Marchesi 
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Between Coordination and Representation 
EU cooperation on UNSC matters occurs at least at three different levels: in the 
capitals, in Brussels and in New York. The national policy is formulated mostly in the 
capitals and this is particularly true for all matters related to the reform of the UN 
body, which are part of the long-term strategic concept of each member state. It is 
generally recognised that “Europeanisation” and “Brusselisation” have been rather 
limited so far.20 The two caveats mentioned above concerning the prudence of 
member states and the nature of the issues on the UNSC agenda constitute the main 
obstacles. In Brussels, UN issues are debated in various Council working groups, and in 
particular in the CONUN (once a month) and in the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC). CONUN (also responsible for UN reform matters), however, is often only an 
information session were issues are debated in general terms following the agenda 
predetermined by the EU Presidency.21 Every six months the group meets at UN 
directors’ level and attempts to provide some steering on UN policy. However, 
member states rely on their delegations in New York to do most of the work, including 
feeding them with information; and Brussels is bypassed. Equally, for what concerns 
the PSC, the attempt to guide EU action in the Security Council is hampered by 
distance and by the very fact that the member states’ ambassadors in New York are 
often recalcitrant to receive steering from their junior colleagues in the PSC. Another 
key organisational problem is having an alignment between these various meetings, 
both in terms of timing and agenda.  
New York, therefore, remains critical both for the day-to-day follow up of the 
negotiations and for the response to crises. And in the New York scene, the primary 
audience is the wider UN membership, not the European Union, especially on 
matters on the UNSC agenda. Although a certain degree of socialisation develops 
among European diplomats,22 this is hardly enough to make them forget their job 
description as representatives of their country’s national interest and prestige on the 
world stage.  
When the EU does have a common position, following the negotiations among 
the capitals, in Brussels and in New York, this can be “represented” in the UNSC. 
Paradoxically, it was the UK ambassador Lord David Hannay who in 1993 was the first 
to bring a Community position to the UNSC during a public meeting on the situation 
                                                 
20 Rasch, op.cit. 
21 Interview with a Commission official, Brussels, 16 January 2008. 
22 See the work of Helen Young, op.cit., on network analysis. BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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of Yugoslavia.23 Following this development, there has been incremental progress 
notwithstanding the initial impediment of the lack of statehood and legal personality 
of the EU. Today, when there is consensus on a particular issue debated in the UNSC, 
the EU can put forward its common position and enhance its visibility. Firstly, the 
Presidency (much more rarely the High Representative for CFSP or, on economic 
issues, a Commissioner) is invited to speak in the UNSC on behalf of the EU. Secondly, 
the EU members seating in the UNSC give their statement after expressing their 
alignment to the EU position which therefore reverberates for as many times as there 
are member states seating in the UNSC. The EU, however, is invited only to the public 
meetings of the UNSC, when the decisions have already been taken and the states 
are just formalising their positions. The Presidency is kept out of the most important 
moment of negotiation and deliberation, which takes place in the informal 
consultations, the “sancta sanctorum” of Security Council’s exclusiveness.24 
Article 19 TEU 
In terms of Treaty provisions, the pivotal element of EU cooperation at the 
United Nation is article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union.25 On the one hand, 
this is the result of the intergovernmental bargaining leading to the Maastricht 
Treaty;26 on the other hand, it codifies a practice that had already slowly developed 
in New York within the European Political Cooperation. As it is clear from the second 
part of the provision, the TEU established three types of obligations for the member 
states serving in the UNSC: information (to the wider EU membership), concertation 
(among the states serving in the UNSC) and the “defence of the positions and 
interests of the Union”. Formally, then the article does not mention coordination nor 
                                                 
23 Francesco Paolo Fulci, “L’Unione Europea alle Nazioni Unite”, Rivista di studi politici 
internazionali, No. 269, Gennaio-Marzo 2001, p. 39. 
24 Ibid., p. 38. 
25 “ 1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.  
In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Mem-
ber States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in 
international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member 
States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. 
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are 
permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, 
ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to 
their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”   
26 Simon Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. Daniele Marchesi 
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representation, although there is a general duty to coordinate within international 
organisations.  
The implementation of this article in New York acquires different formats 
according to the actors and issues involved and the importance of the question 
under discussion. Cooperation started with meetings on Friday mornings at the 
Heads of Mission level, already before the TEU. At this stage, the issues discussed were 
the general ones on the agenda of the UN, while the UNSC was absolutely 
“taboo”,27 mainly due to the resistance of the UK and France. This gradually 
changed through the EPC process but remained a rather formal information exercise 
even after the Maastricht Treaty. A major breakthrough in the actual implementation 
of article 19 was realised only in the year 2000, at a moment at which the debate on 
the UNSC was at a pause, when, under the French Presidency, Spain proposed a 
weekly “briefing” on UNSC matters. The practice was later standardised by the 
Council in 2002.28 These meetings are held on Thursday afternoon on the premises of 
the Commission Delegation, where a Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat has 
also been installed since 1995 to support the general EU coordination effort across 
the UN bodies. Chairing the meeting is a diplomat of the member state holding the 
Presidency, supported by an official of the Secretariat, while on the other side of the 
table seats a representative of the Commission. Even if limited mostly to an 
information exercise, the briefings are “something that is absolutely advantageous 
for the EU member states”,29 providing access to first-hand information. Other UN 
members on the contrary have to rely on information leaking out of the UNSC or on 
the statements of the President of the UNSC, which are watered down, made public 
and do not assess the different national positions inside the UNSC.  
The content and scope of the discussion at these meetings is rather indefinite. 
The EU Presidency circulates among the European missions the agenda of the 
meeting, which remains flexible. Firstly, the members that are sitting inside the UNSC 
brief the other EU members on what has been discussed during the week. Secondly, 
the monthly agenda of the UNSC is informally “debated”, with delegates from the 
various member states raising questions to the members sitting in the Council. This 
practice was strongly sponsored under the Swedish Presidency in 2001 with the 
objective of transforming the briefings into more meaningful and forward-looking 
                                                 
27 Fulci, op.cit., p. 39. 
28 See Council of Ministers of the European Union, Internal Working Paper on the Implemen-
tation of Article 19 TEU, 16 July 2002, Brussels, SN 3133/02. 
29 Interview at the Commission Delegation in New York, February 2005.  BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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meetings. The states that want to maintain a higher profile in the UN but are not 
permanent members (especially Germany, Italy and Spain) are those that are 
keener towards this practice. Their idea is to institutionalise it to transform it into a real 
preparation of the UNSC meetings. Achieving this “integration objective”- in the 
sense that it would promote further transfer of power in the CFSP - would allow them 
to participate in the formulation of the policy of the UNSC, even when they are 
excluded from it.  
Having described the complex institutional set-up of EU cooperation and 
representation on UNSC matters, it is possible to analyse its relationship with the 
debate on the UNSC reform. This relationship emerges more clearly when looking at 
the variation in the member states’ positions towards improving coordination and 
representation and, particularly, at the position of Germany, which is the crucial 
player with its bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC.30  
Proposals of Improvement in the Shadow of UNSC Reform 
It took almost ten years to put in practice article 19 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Following its reunification, Germany became more confident of its chances and 
rights to obtain a permanent seat and France and the UK quickly undertook to 
support it. After the first diplomatic confrontation of Italy and Germany on the issue 
of UNSC reform ended with a procedural resolution of the General Assembly in 
1998,31 the debate on reform was internalised in the EU. The events that led to the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, with the bypassing of the UNSC, increased the 
determination of some EU member states to better coordinate their action in the 
UNSC and to raise the profile of the EU. However, it was also the stalemate on the 
UNSC reform that induced a change of strategy in Germany. The German 
government under Kohl was divided and criticised at home for having pushed too 
much for a national seat, so at least until the end of 2001, there was an attempt to 
“Europeanise” the approach to UN reform.32 The left-to-centre Schroeder govern-
ment, and in particular Foreign Minister Fischer, was favourable to an EU seat in the 
UNSC as a long-term goal.33 This had a dual consequence for the German strategy: 
                                                 
30 For a similar view and an analysis of the evolution of the German position see Roos, Franke 
and Hellmann, op.cit.  
31 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/30, 23 November 1998, New York. 
32 See for example former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, quoted in Deutsche Welle, 
German UN Aspirations Backed by Europe, 24 September 2004, dw-world.de (22/3/2005). 
33  Joschka Fischer, Die Zeit, 12 November 1998, www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/ 
fischer.htm; and N-TV Television “Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Fischer on Current 
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externally, Germany proposed to devote its possible permanent seat to the 
European interest; internally, it supported the idea of a “European embryonic seat” 
or “European laboratory”.34 The diplomatic services of Germany, Spain and Italy 
worked intensively between the capitals and New York for about two years in 
preparation for the German and Spanish elective membership to the UNSC for 2002-
2004, where this idea could have been experimented.  
The idea came from Italy that wanted to tame the German position with a 
concrete integrative proposal (integration objective or “integrative balancing”). This 
consisted in having one of the European non-permanent members “hosting” a 
delegate from the EU Presidency or from the Council Secretariat while seating in the 
UNSC.35 The idea varied from that of simply assisting to the UNSC meetings and 
collecting information to that, eventually, of the national delegate leaving the floor 
to let the EU delegate intervene in the debate. Arguably, this project would not 
necessitate any amendment of the UN Charter and would grant the EU greater 
visibility and access. However, the two permanent members have not been ready to 
accept the presence of a representative of the EU in the UNSC by default. They 
prioritise “external effectiveness” and, in their view, it is not desirable to maintain in 
the Security Council a too cohesive profile among the European members. This 
would be interpreted as a sort of “blockism” by the other UNSC members, who would 
then probably also try to create among themselves artificial groups and similar 
structures, as a result paralysing the UNSC.36 A common position requires an effort of 
internal negotiation among the EU member states and, once specified, it generates 
a static, often ineffective, negotiation profile. That is why the permanent EU members 
prefer negotiating informally among themselves in the UNSC, with the United States, 
Russia and China. In this way they can maintain a position of power and more 
autonomy towards the rest of the EU membership.  
Eventually, as the elective term of Germany and Spain in the UNSC was starting 
during the worst phase of the Iraq crisis between 2002 and 2003, the laboratory 
proposal was abandoned. Rather, the German government launched its second bid 
                                                 
or not there will be a European seat. I am very much in favour of this. However, we cannot 
realistically expect this to be achieved quickly.”, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/ 
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34 For a brief discussion of this proposal see Blavoukos Spyros and Bourantonis Dimitris, "EU 
Representation in the UN Security Council: Bridging the ‘Capabilities-Expectations’ Gap?", 
Essex Papers in Politics and Government, No. 157, May 2002; and Fulci, op.cit., 2001, p. 41.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Anja Mählmann, Brussels Goes New York: The EU and its Institutions as Actors on the United 
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for a permanent seat in the context of the momentous run-up to the 2005 World 
Summit in New York, which had to agree on a of far-reaching reform of the UN 
system. Subsequently, more conservative proposals for EU “concertation” in the 
UNSC were explored by Italy and Belgium during their term as rotating members. 37 
These include increasing the coordination within the group of EU members seating in 
the UNSC, in the capitals, in Brussels and in New York. The EU Presidency is also invited 
to these meetings and serves as a link with the rest of the membership. Clearly, 
though, these efforts are not fully institutionalised and can vary depending on the EU 
members actually elected in the UNSC and on whether they are interested in EU 
coordination. Furthermore, one may expect a general preference towards favouring 
a roll-back in these practices on the part of the UK and France.38  
Constraints and Opportunities: Three Differing Perspectives 
There are three main factors that limit the cumulative trend of EU cooperation 
on UNSC matters and that make this a gradual and ambiguous process with an 
uncertain outcome. Firstly, from a realist point of view, there is the resistance of the 
two permanent EU members to any attempt to interfere with their exclusive preroga-
tives as permanent members of the UNSC. Traditionally, these two have promoted 
proposals that would create incentives for Germany to separate itself from the rest of 
the EU membership and to orient its strategy towards the directoire. An example of 
this is the offer by France to include a German diplomat in the French delegation to 
the UN.39 In this sense, France and the UK pursue an “inter-relational objective”. They 
seek to increase coordination as a means to share information among members, 
increasing the sense of ownership and participation, while at the same time diluting 
the pressure to reform the UNSC.40 A similar but reverse logic pushes the temporary 
members to cooperate with the other EU member states and inform them, although 
                                                 
37 See Drieskens, Marchesi and Kerremans, op.cit. 
38 Antonio Missiroli and Sven Biscop have suggested a possible “window of opportunity” for 
France and the UK in that sense, with the new term for elected members, when it is likely that 
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November 2007.  
39 Hugh Williamson, “Germany to Fight for Seat on Security Council”, Financial Times, 9 
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UNSC. 
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this effort varies.41 In this sense, the deadlock at the UN institutional level (no UN 
reform) produces pressure on them to coordinate/integrate to gain a degree of 
permanent access to the Security Council through the EU (integration objective). This 
was clearly the case following 1998, when also Germany, frustrated in its bid for a 
permanent seat, became more interested in promoting the EU presence in the 
UNSC.  
Secondly, the French and British behaviour is only possible within an institutional 
context, which locked them into a privileged position that they are unlikely to 
renounce freely. If it is true that their position in the UNSC hinders a certain type of 
development in the CFSP, this condition/context is historically and legally established 
in the UN Charter. It is further safeguarded by the TEU provision that in the very last 
sentence of article 19 prioritises their responsibilities towards the UN as permanent 
members over their membership of the EU.42  
Thirdly, from a sociological perspective, the practices and norms surrounding 
Security Council membership hinder the capacity of member states to push for 
change. As a Belgian Permanent Representative put it, when the EU member enters 
the Security Council, it “enters into another world with its own rules of procedure, 
tacit understandings, negotiation culture and political dynamics”, where rigidly 
defending EU common positions could be counter-productive.43 Even the most 
reformist and integrationist member states are restrained by what is “appropriate” in 
the UNSC44 and, once they actually enter the UNSC, they have to act in symphony 
with the permanent members, if they do not want to be marginalised. Generally, EU 
elected members serving in the UNSC have to maintain a difficult equilibrium during 
their term between being “pro-EU” and the temptation of taking full advantage of 
their temporary privileges as UNSC members.45 The somewhat cautious 2007-2008 
Italian and Belgian term in the Security Council provides a good example in this 
sense. Italy and Belgium had publicised their intention to enhance Europe’s profile in 
the UNSC, yet the long-term audacious idea of the “European laboratory” was 
wholly abandoned well before the mandate began. In short, nothing revolutionary 
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was attempted.46 The same explanation is valid for the tenaciously low profile 
maintained by the EU supranational actors on these issues, beyond the few 
extemporaneous declarations of support for an EU seat in the long term.47 From the 
same sociological view, the absence of an open debate on UN reform among EU 
members in the Europeanised context of Brussels has hampered the development of 
a common analysis and discourse on these issues. This explains how EU member 
states have been able to frame conflicting strategies towards coordination and 
representation in New York, within the same pro-European rhetoric.  
Notwithstanding these constraints, rational, institutional and sociological logics 
are also conducive to a certain degree of limited institutionalisation.48 As is typical for 
the EU system, federalist and intergovernmental strategies coexist within a complex 
institutional configuration, where the overall EU presence is increasing incrementally 
while, at the same time, the member states maintain and actually enhance their 
control.49 Equally typical is that these practices do not simplify the EU policy 
processes. On the contrary, also on UNSC matters, there is an increasing complexity 
and differentiation with the creation of new and overlapping instances of coordina-
tion (meetings, committees, focal points), at various levels and with varying member-
ships. If ratified, the Lisbon Treaty50 would build on this complexity, without necessarily 
tilting the balance towards either a supranational or intergovernmental CFSP.51 There 
is some evidence that the various innovations introduced in the external relations 
domain would establish further incremental improvements in the institutional context 
of EU presence in the Security Council.52 On the one hand, the legal personality 
undercuts a (small) part of the arguments used against the EU seat.53 On the other 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 The European Parliament supports this solution, at least in the long term. See European 
Parliament Resolution of 9 June 2005 on the Reform of the United Nations (P6_TA(2005)0237), 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 124 E/549, 25.5.2006, p. 552. But also the 
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Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997, pp. 267-299.  
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hand, the new figure of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and Vice President of the Commission would be equipped with the necessary 
status and tools (e.g. the External Action Service) to increase the EU’s visibility in the 
current configuration and in the future one, if any reform is agreed upon. Overall 
though, notwithstanding the worries of some member states54, the ambiguity 
between intergovernmental and supranational tensions in the EU’s institutional 
structure will remain. Similarly, the new article 34 of the TEU would slightly reformulate 
article 19, but is unlikely to change the fundamental characteristics of European 
coordination in the Security Council (e.g. no delegation from the EU to the members 
serving in the UNSC, priority of responsibilities towards UN over EU membership, 
substantial control by the UNSC members over the extent of information provided to 
the EU and over the presence of the High Representative in the UNSC).55 
 
4. UN Security Council Reform and Implications for the EU 
 
The stalemate in the reform of the Security Council in the last fifteen years, 
notwithstanding the general recognition of the need to reform, reveals the huge 
importance that is attached to this issue. Nobody is willing to give in and all the 
attempts to attenuate the fear of the irreversibility of any reform are not working. The 
idea,56 for instance, to have a temporary reform with a compulsory review in 2020 
does not really convince anybody and the same well-known positions are applied to 
the temporary period. In the multitude of ideas for reform that were proposed in the 
years within the infamous Open-Ended Working Group,57 the main issue of 
contention remains the problem of membership expansion and in particular of 
whether or not to establish new permanent members. In Europe, finding a consensus 
was impossible and the resistance of the two European permanent members to 
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discuss a common seat in the framework of the CFSP “back-fired” in the acrimonious 
competition between Italy and Germany, as the latter decided to take the national 
path towards a seat.58 Similar logics and regional rivalries, though, apply to all the 
other continents: Pakistan against India, South Korea and China against Japan, 
Mexico and Argentina against Brazil, and no agreement in Africa.  
In this context, the important 2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats 
Challenges and Changes59 did not pick sides over this basic question, and decided 
instead to propose two alternative models both expanding the UNSC to 23 members 
(Model A introduces new permanent members; Model B proposes no new perma-
nent members but a new category of longer-term renewable seats). These two 
options can still be considered as the two main ideal-types in the negotiations. In the 
EU, Model A was promoted and embraced by Germany (who signed in September 
2004 with Japan, Brazil and India - the G-4 - a common declaration of mutual 
support in their bid to a permanent seat); while Model B is more congenial to states 
that oppose an expansion of permanent members (particularly Italy and Spain).  
In general, Model A is more simple to understand and, probably, to implement. 
A number of respected states are elected and co-opted among the permanent 
members, in order to make the UNSC more representative of the realities of today’s 
world. Depending on the vision that one has of the future CFSP, Model A can present 
advantages or serious shortcomings. While a permanent seat to Germany would 
enhance the voice of Europe in the world, the rest of Europe would lose an elective 
seat and 43 states from Western and Eastern Europe would have to fight over two 
two-year non-renewable elective seats. It is no wonder that countries such as Italy 
and Spain are not very enthusiastic about the proposal. This explains why most of the 
campaigning effort by the states bidding for permanent membership - including 
Germany - is carried out outside of their regional constituency, where rivals are less 
active. Notwithstanding this, according to positions expressed in the General 
Assembly, an important number of European states support Germany. Though it is 
difficult to clearly identify these countries, since the positions on this issue are often 
maintained only implicitly, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, the 
United Kingdom, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Ukraine 
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have all expressed their support for the position of the G-4.60 Often, expressions of 
support are motivated by the overarching lack of confidence that the reform will 
actually ever occur. In this sense, taking sides with a powerful country aspiring to 
permanent membership can guarantee considerable short-term diplomatic gains at 
zero cost.  
Model B’s main difference with Model A is that all new seats would be elective, 
which, as argued by the proponents, would stimulate transparency and competition 
and enhance the accountability of the UNSC members towards the rest of the 
United Nations. In particular, a certain category of states that are prominent in their 
region for their contribution to the UN according to article 23 of the Charter would 
be eligible for a second mandate.61 This option could eventually also entail the 
setting up of some kind of regional mechanism for electing the rotating members. 
Model B is complicated and the concept of renewable or rotating seats, on which it 
stands, has been criticised for creating another category of membership without a 
clear-cut understanding of what would be the criteria of eligibility. Finally, the model 
is looked upon with suspicion by the small member states that would see a relative 
reduction in their already bleak chances of serving in the UNSC. Nevertheless, while 
Model A creates members, Model B creates seats, therefore avoiding establishing 
new status quo situations that would not be flexible and adaptive to a changing 
world.62 In this sense, it is worth to mention the “Green Model” proposal63 presented 
by the movement “Uniting for Consensus”, led by Italy, Spain, Pakistan and other 
members of the so-called “Coffee Club”, which has traditionally opposed any new 
permanent seat.64 This model proposes ten new short-term seats, equally distributed 
to the regional areas and with the possibility of re-election. All states would be 
eligible to the twenty non-permanent seats, without preconditions, and regional 
groups would be free to develop their own rotation mechanisms for these seats, in 
order to have some states achieving membership more often than others. This model 
would then also channel a potentially growing role for regional organisations, while 
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leaving the door open for more ambitious solutions needing Charter modifications, 
for example allowing for regional representation. 
As was shown above, the stalemate in reforming the UN level has had an 
impact on the CFSP since it has increased the willingness of key EU member states to 
coordinate on UNSC matters. Similarly, the success of either one of the models of 
UNSC reform could have a lasting and different effect in terms of institutional 
opportunity and path-dependency on the evolution of European foreign policy.65 
The final section will advance some educated guesses on what would be the impact 
of a possible reform on the development of the CFSP. There are two possible 
scenarios. 
Scenario A: Directoire in the CFSP 
In the context of an enlarged EU-27, it seems inevitable that the EU member 
states endorse some kind of flexible engagement into foreign policy issues, so that 
those “willing and able” can take the lead.66 This pattern is already at test with the 
EU-3 on Iran, where Germany was associated to the contact group of the 
permanent five (called P5+1 or G-6), and Italy also insists to be included.67 Currently, 
this model of cooperation is not institutionalised and can serve optimally the purpose 
of the EU, with different groups forming according to the issue, in a sort of division of 
labour.68 
With a reform of the type prospected in Model A and with Germany as a 
permanent member, this flexible system would become more and more institution-
alised and stabilised. The influence of the core of the big three member states would 
grow in Europe and in the world. Germany, as the biggest state in the EU should be 
able to triangulate between the interests of its closest partner, France, and those of 
the UK, taking advantage also of its important relationship with the United States.69  
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The problem with this approach is twofold. Firstly, it is static in nature. This is 
inherent to the concept of creating a new permanent member.70 Even though the 
traditionally integrationist approach of Germany leaves room to believe that it would 
use its weight to enhance the EU interest and profile in the UN,71 this attitude would 
probably not be sustainable in the long-run. Model A lacks intrinsically accountability 
and this could lead to an inexorable drift of German foreign policy towards 
privileging national concerns. This is to be expected especially when taking into 
account the social-institutional logic of what is the appropriate behaviour within the 
UNSC. In short, even though in its rhetoric Germany appeals to a permanent seat as 
a temporary solution in view of a common EU representation, there is a concrete risk 
that it will become itself part of the establishment.72 Therefore, it is plausible that this 
reform would hinder the progress made by the EU in UNSC coordination or, at least, it 
would deprive it of meaning by circumscribing and shifting the problem of 
coordination to the three member states having permanent membership in the 
UNSC. On the other hand, the efforts to create ascending mechanisms in the EU 
towards the expression of “a single voice” (e.g. forward looking article 19 meetings, 
qualified majority voting) would be put on the backburner. 
Secondly, the other EU member states would have to rely on the big three for 
information and leadership, as the possibility of being elected to the remaining 
Security Council seats would be reduced considerably. In the long-term this could 
reduce their sense of shared responsibility, diminish their activeness within the CFSP 
and overburden the directoire.  
Scenario B: Enhancing Coordination and Accountability in the CFSP 
It seems that the Model B ideal-type, avoiding the creation of new permanent 
seats would accommodate better an EU willing to speak with “a single voice”. Some 
of the members of the “Uniting for Consensus” movement went as far as to propose 
a “regional model”, in which new permanent seats would indeed be created, but 
would be allocated to states rotating in representation of their regional group. While 
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pursuing integration and identity objectives, the position of both the Italian and 
Spanish government is strongly informed by national interest.73 Their strategies also 
cover the fear to lose status and the frustration of not being able to themselves strive 
for a permanent seat. Tactically, the audacious project of opening the UNSC to 
regional organisations also serves the purpose of delaying a quick and functional 
reform.  
Overall, the regional model of UNSC has a clear potential to stimulate an 
integrated EU CFSP. The EU would be allotted one regional seat, while another 
(allocated to the EES group) would be shared among all the European states that 
are not members of the EU. The member states would then establish a mechanism of 
rotation or election of the state responsible for expressing the interest of the whole 
EU. The member state elected to hold the regional permanent seat would be 
accountable to the membership and would therefore maintain strong links of 
information and coordination with the other member states.74 Even the fall-back 
positions, e.g. the “Green model”, would end up having similar effects simply by 
removing the prohibition for immediate re-election to non-permanent seats. 
Logically, some member states would try to be re-elected and would therefore 
enhance their accountability towards their regional constituency.   
Eventually this reform would increase the pressure on France and the UK to 
relinquish their permanent seats, as it would become more difficult for them to play 
an autonomous role in the UNSC. Whether this would enhance the EU’s external 
effectiveness and its capacity to promote its policies at the UN, is not clear. Certainly, 
it would open the institutional door to a common EU seat supplemented, possibly, by 




The problem of an EU presence in the UNSC has been at the centre of CFSP 
development, as it constitutes one of the most noticeable points of friction between 
intergovernmental and supranational thinking on the future of European integration. 
Moreover, the UN is a crucial stage for the credibility and visibility of EU foreign policy. 
The purpose of this paper was to unveil the link between the debate on the UNSC 
reform and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP is 
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driven mainly by domestic and external factors that are independent from the UN 
level. However, it was argued that the UN arena also plays a role in carving 
institutional paths and opening opportunities that can catalyse or hinder the build-up 
of a European foreign policy. UN institutions and processes should be given here a 
broad and not only legalistic interpretation, as a series of unwritten rules, norms and 
codes that constrain a purely rationalist understanding of states’ behaviour. Within 
this institutional context, the sociological “logic of appropriateness”, for instance, can 
offer interesting insights regarding the EU’s presence in the UNSC. Therefore, even in 
the domain of the Security Council, realist approaches can be usefully tempered by 
insights from other conceptual frameworks such as historical and sociological 
institutionalism.  
The paper looked mainly at the case of EU coordination and representation in 
the UNSC in the dynamic context EU and UN reform. In this sense, the link between 
the two reform processes was identified in two steps: (1) by showing how a lack of UN 
reform has induced, so far, a certain type of behaviour in the EU member states, 
notably pushing them to promote internal coordination; (2) by offering educated 
guesses on the plausible impact on the EU of two alternative models of UNSC 
membership expansion. Concerning the first analytical step, the paper provides 
evidence that some member states are promoting more coordination for integration 
and identity objectives, while others are supporting this increase of coordination for 
inter-relational and external objectives. The consequence of this ambiguity is a 
process of institutionalisation, where an increase in EU presence has gone hand in 
hand with the resilience of member states’ control. This process has been stimulated 
and informed by the discourse on (the lack of) a UNSC reform.  
Concerning the second, more speculative step, the paper argued that the 
possible reform of the Security Council could represent a “critical juncture” for the 
future development of the CFSP. A reform granting permanent membership to 
Germany would probably consolidate and institutionalise the directoire structure that 
is already emerging in the EU. Not surprisingly, France and the UK support Germany in 
its ambition: while European overrepresentation in the UNSC would worsen, 
Germany’s presence in its national capacity would actually legitimise their own 
position as permanent members. The success of this strategy would have a double 
effect. In the short term, it would be strongly divisive in Brussels. In the longer term, the 
institutionalisation of the directoire could either produce the rallying of the states 
behind the leadership of France, Germany and the UK in a flying-geese kind of BRIGG Paper 3/2008 
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pattern, or re-launch national foreign policies in a pattern of dispersion and sporadic 
cooperation on a “coalition of the willing” basis. 
The other trend of CFSP goes towards further integration, more coordination 
and, ultimately, towards the need for qualified majority voting. This study has flagged 
out some areas of development: there is some dynamism in the way the EU 
coordinates on UNSC issues and there are some opportunities, mainly on the 
representation side, which could be opened by the Lisbon Treaty, if ratified. A Model 
B reform, which does not create new permanent members, could revitalise this trend. 
This model would keep some institutional venues open for increased EU coordination 
and more accountability of the member states serving in the UN Security Council 
towards the rest of the EU membership.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the emergence of the EU as a political union with 
a strong foreign policy has played a big part in sparking the call for a UNSC reform to 
take into account the new international order. The fact that today, beyond the 
rhetoric on “effective multilateralism”, the EU is not capable of taking a common 
stand on this crucial issue, is probably the most instructive lesson that the UN reform 
has to teach to the CFSP. Eventually, the EU, by choosing between its federal and 
intergovernmental natures, will have to play a part also in finding the final solution.  
 Daniele Marchesi 
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